Introduction
Autobiographical memories play a vital role in providing a coherent sense of self (Conway & Pleydell-Peace, 2000) and the manner in which past experiences are appraised can also regulate self-esteem and mood (Wilson & Ross, 2003) . Autobiographical memory deficits are typical in individuals with an ASD (Bruck, London, Landa, & Goodman, 2007; Crane & Goddard, 2008; Crane, Goddard, & Pring, 2009; Goddard, Dritschel, Robinson, & Howlin, 2014) and these deficits are thought to contribute to poor self-understanding (Lind, 2010) . Autobiographical memory impairment may also be a factor in the formal diagnosis of an ASD from a multidisciplinary team that included either a psychologist or psychiatrist was required and a score of 15 or greater on the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) . The mean SCQ score for the ASD group was 23.07 (SD = 4.54). Control participants did not have an ASD diagnosis and were matched with the ASD group for age, gender, and full scale IQ. There were no statistically significant differences between groups on either of the control variables (see Table 1 ).
Measures of independent and control variables
2.2.1. Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ, Rutter et al., 2003) A 40-item checklist for completion by parents or carers. The SCQ is a screening tool for ASD that has established validity ([ 7 5 _ T D $ D I F F ] Chandler et al., 2007) . A score of 15 or above is indicative of an ASD diagnosis. (WASI, Wechsler, 1999) Full scale IQ was obtained using the two-subtest version (matrix reasoning and vocabulary) in order to reduce testing time.
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence

Measures of dependent variables
2.3.1. Self-Perception Profile for Adolescents (SPP Harter, 2012) This self-report measure takes a multidimensional approach to the system of self (Harter, 1999) . It consists of 45 items, each scored on a 4 point scale, that assess an individual's evaluation of competence in 8 domains (scholastic, athletic, physical appearance, job, romantic appeal, behavioural conduct and close friendship). It also yields a score for global selfworth that is independent of competence scores in the aforementioned domains and which is akin to Rosenberg's (1979) concept of overall self-esteem. Higher scores indicate improved opinions of self. (Weissman, Orvaschel, & Padian, 1980) A valid and reliable measure of depressed mood in children and adolescents (Weissman et al., 1980) . It consists of 20 items scored on a 4-point scale with higher scores reflecting greater levels of depressed mood with a score of 15 as suggestive of depressive symptoms.
Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale for Children (CES-DC)
Self-defining and everyday memory task
Adapted from Singer and Moffitt (1992) and modified for use with adolescents, participants were asked to describe three self-defining memories and three everyday memories. A self-defining memory was described as 'A memory that would help me understand the kind of person you are or would tell me something about yourself. It should be something that you feel strongly about and something you have thought about a lot since it happened. It should be at least 6 months old'. An everyday memory was described to participants as 'A memory that you personally experienced. It doesn't have to tell me anything about who you are as a person and it can be something you feel either strongly or weakly about. It should be at least 6 months old.' Participants were required to narrate memories to the experimenter and interviews were recorded for accuracy in transcription. Where required, participants were prompted for detail and encouraged towards specific retrieval. After memory retrieval, participants rated their memories on three dimensions adapted from the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) . These included emotional intensity rated on a 5 point scale (1 = very weak to 5 = very strong) and, on a 3 point scale, the extent to which memories were self-revealing, (1 = not very much to 3 = a lot). The primary visual perspective (field or observer) from which participants reported to have experienced each memory was also recorded. Visual images were used to illustrate the difference between field and observer perspectives.
In order to examine participants' ability to identify self-defining versus everyday memories, the narratives were blind rated for memory type by two independent raters giving a percentage score of memories correctly identified. Narratives were also rated for valence, meaning making and theme in order to explore differences between groups. Inter-rater agreement on all measures was acceptable and disagreements were resolved by discussion (kappa coefficients > 0.79). Valence was coded as positive, negative or neutral and where memories contained both positive and negative elements, ratings pertained to the outcome valence. Each memory was coded for meaning making with a score of 1 given where there was evidence that memories provided insight or lesson learning (cf. McLean & Thorne, 2001 ). Themes were adapted from the description provided by McLean and Thorne (2001) as detailed below. Event not classifiable: this category included any narrative that did not fit strongly in the above categories.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually at their home or school. The testing session lasted approximately 60 min. Task order was fixed with the WASI administered first, followed by the Self-defining and Everyday Memory Task, SSPA and CES-DS. The study gained ethical approval from Goldsmiths, University of London Ethics Committee (Psychology) and was conducted in accordance with British Psychological Society guidelines on ethics.
Results
Data were first screened to ensure that the requirements for parametric testing were met. Where data violated assumptions of normality or variance, non-parametric tests were employed.
Self-Defining and everyday memory task
We first checked that participants understood task instructions by comparing the number of self-defining versus everyday memories correctly identified by an independent rater. This revealed no differences between groups (unrelated t (30) = 0.19, p = 0.85; Cohen's d = 0.007; ASD mean number incorrectly identified: 1.27, SD = 1.03 vs control mean: 1.20, SD = 0.95). To test our hypothesis that the self-defining and everyday memories of the ASD group would be less distinguishable on qualities of a] emotional intensity b] self revealing rating and] visual perspective, we employed a series of 2 (Group: ASD vs. control) Â 2 (Memory type: self defining versus everyday) ANOVAs. There was a statistically significant main effect of memory type on emotional intensity (F(1,30) = 23.26, p = 0.001, hp 2 = 0.44) as self defining memories were rated more intense than everyday memories (self-defining: mean intensity: 3.76, SD = 0.85 vs. everyday: mean intensity: Fig. 1 . Post hoc comparisons (Bonferonni t's) revealed the control group to rate their self-defining memories as significantly more self-revealing than their everyday memories; in contrast, the ASD group rated their everyday memories to be significantly more self-revealing than their self-defining.
Visual perspective was examined by comparing groups on the percentage of memories that were deemed to be experienced with a field perspective. Contrary to that hypothesized, groups did not differ, (F(1,30) = 2.06, p = 0.16, hp 2 = 0.06), (AS field mean = 61.46, SD = 26.15 vs. control field mean = 52.09, SD = 21.28). There was also no significant group main effect (F (1,30) = 1.06, p = 0.31, hp 2 = 0.03) or significant group Â memory type interaction (F(1,30) = 0.1.07, p = 0.31, hp 2 = 0.03). We then explored memories using the experimenter ratings. We first analysed the number of memories rated as either positive or negative with a 3 way (group: ASD vs. control x memory type: self-defining vs. everyday Â emotion valence: positive vs. negative) mixed ANOVA. Statistically significant main effects for both emotion valence (F(1,30) = 15.68, p = 0.001, hp 2 = 0.34) and memory type (F(1,30) = 9.10, p = 0.005, hp 2 = 0.23) emerged, as more positive than negative memories were recalled (positive mean: 3.00, SD = 1.41 vs. negative mean: 1.34, SD = 1.23) and self defining memories were more likely to have an emotional content than everyday memories (self defining mean: 2.47, SD = 0.67 vs everyday mean:1.87, SD = 0.91). . Given our apriori hypothesis that the ASD group would have fewer positive selfdefining memories and more negative self-defining memories than the control group, we examined the two-way (Group Â Valence) analysis on self-defining memories alone. This yielded a statistically significant main effect of valence (F (1,30) = 13.97, p = 0.001, hp 2 = 0.32) qualified by a significant interaction effect (F(1,30) = 6.03, p = 0.001, hp 2 = 0.17). Post hoc analyses (Bonferroni t's) revealed a bias towards positive content and away from negative content in the self-defining memories of the control group; a bias that was absent in the ASD group (see Table 2 ).
Ratings for meaning making revealed few incidences of explicit references to lessons learnt. Out of the 96 memory narratives gathered for each group, 4/96 identified meaning making from the ASD group and 9/96, for the comparison group. Therefore no further analysis was undertaken. Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate the memory themes of both self-defining and everyday memories for both groups. There were no significant differences in themes for everyday memories (ps > 0.1). With respect to self-defining memories however, the ASD group retrieved significantly more memories with a recreation theme (U = 61, p = 0.01, r = 0.48) whereas the control group retrieved significantly more memories with an achievement theme than the ASD group (U = 74, p = 0.04, r = 0.39).
Depression and self esteem
Scores on the CDES yielded unequal between group variance and therefore Mann Whitney was employed to analyse group differences and revealed no significant difference in mean score (U = 85, p = 0.1; r = 0.28, ASD group mean: 12.31, SD = 5.61 vs control mean: 8.81, SD = 3.18). MANOVA was employed to examine group differences in perceived competence on the various facets of self esteem. The ASD group scored lower overall (F(9, 22) = 14.89, p = 0.001, hp 2 = 0.86) indicating lower levels of self esteem. Univariate between group ANOVAs showed that the ASD group reported poorer self-perceptions in all domains other than physical and school competence. 
Relationship between valence of self-defining memories and indices of psychological health
Global self-esteem and depression score were employed as our measures of psychological health. Relationships between these measures and the number of positive and negative self-defining memories were examined using Pearson Product Moment Correlations [ 8 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] (Table 3) . Given the large number of correlation analyses undertaken, alpha was set at p < 0.01 in order to reduce the chance of making a type 1 error. Across all participants, as predicted, a statistically significant negative correlation was revealed between the number of negative self-defining memories and self-esteem. Within group correlation did not reach significance although observation of the correlation coefficients suggested that the effect was largely carried by the ASD group as the correlation was close to 0 in the controls. In order to examine whether the relationship between negative memories and self-esteem was specific to self-defining memories, we also observed the correlation between everyday negative memories and self-esteem. This revealed a coefficient close to 0 (Pearson's r = 0.08, p = 0.67) that was significantly different to that found for self-defining memories (z = 2, p = 0.05, two-tailed). There was also a statistically significant negative relationship between depression and self-esteem across all participants; which remained significant when considering the control group alone. All other correlations did not reach statistical significance.
Discussion
The current study aimed to build on what is already known about autobiographical memory in ASD by examining selfdefining versus everyday memories in the context of mood and self-esteem in adolescents with and without an ASD diagnosis. Results demonstrated that while the ASD group could identify and distinguish self-defining from everyday memories as shown by independent ratings, they failed to recognise these experiences as a special means of selfunderstanding. Both groups reported self-defining memories to be more emotionally intense than everyday memories and against this background, adolescents with autism may have shied away from this intensity and preferred to focus on their everyday experiences for self-understanding. Nevertheless, results suggested that it is these self-defining, rather than everyday memories that exert an influence on their self-esteem; a reduced bias towards positive memories (relative to controls) was evident in the ASD group and lower global self-esteem was linked to a propensity towards negative selfdefining memories.
Previous research has shown that adults with an ASD extract less meaning and insight from their self-defining memories and have a less stable sense of self. Our data, originating from a sample of adolescents, are in line with these findings but suggest that there be developmental differences in meaning making. Both ASD and control groups infrequently mentioned incidences of lesson learning from their past suggesting that active reflection and analysis of experience may emerge later in typical adolescent development (cf. Berna et al. (2016) showed that individuals high on autistic traits were more likely to agree that their beliefs about themselves were changeable and that they spent less time wondering about the kind of person that they were. Our data also point to instable/weak representations of self. Interestingly our ASD adolescents recognised the kinds of personal experiences that allowed others to define them, but they did not themselves relate to these experiences, referring instead to their equally positive, but less emotional, everyday memories for examples of self. The increased emotional intensity of self-defining memories may have served to confuse rather than strengthen selfrepresentations. Individuals with autism have less coherent personal narratives (Losh & Capps, 2003) and problems in emotion processing (Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004 ) may go some way to explain why our adolescents with autism had different versions of self for their own versus others' understanding. (Appendix A describes self defining and everyday memories of ASD participants and gives a flavour of the kind of everyday experiences that are deemed as more self-revealing in this group).
It is widely accepted that autobiographical memory plays an important function in self-understanding. Conway and Pledell-Pearce's model (2004) suggests that working goals of the self initiate and guide retrieval towards long term memories associated with self-understanding. Our finding that adolescents with autism have weak connections with experiences that they recognise on one level as self-defining, points towards a reduced symbiosis between self understanding and memory in autism. This may result in a less stable self-representation due to a failure to explicitly recognise the relevance of past experiences. Our findings add to other research that also suggests impaired function of autobiographical memory in ASD. For example, in the domain of personal problem-solving where autobiographical memories provide a database for generating solutions (Williams, 1996) , it has been demonstrated that adults with autism retrieve appropriate memories when cued by problem scenarios, but fail to use the information contained within those memories for generating strategies (Goddard, Dritschel, Howlin, & Patel, 2007) . Together these findings suggest that ASD is associated with a difficulty in drawing on the knowledge contained within autobiographical memories for ongoing cognitive tasks such as understanding self and solving personal problems. Despite a reduced identification with self-defining memories in the ASD group, these memories nevertheless exerted an influence on their self-concepts through self-esteem; moreover self-esteem was lower in the ASD group compared to controls. Adolescence is a critical period for self-esteem development and individuals with an ASD are clearly vulnerable. Positive self-esteem requires positive images (Hulme, Hirsch, & Stopa, 2012) and our data showed the importance of a bias towards positive memories when identifying self-defining (but not everyday) experiences. Our ASD group did not show this effect and lower levels of self-esteem were related to negative self-defining memories. Lack of bias would appear to reflect a failure of memory function rather than reduction in the number of positive experiences. Overall, groups did not differ on the number of positive and negative memories retrieved but the controls were more able to direct their memory search towards positive targets when retrieving self-defining memories.
Thematic analysis indicated achievement to be a more common goal for the control group relative to those with an ASD, who in turn focused more on recreation themes. Interestingly these effects mirror those of Crane et al. (2013) and suggest that ASD and non-ASD differences in the thematic goals of self-defining memories remain stable. This is important because it may highlight a vulnerability and negativity related to achievement in domains that become important during adolescence. A propensity towards a variety of goals may be driven by cognitive flexibility that in turn may impact self-complexity. Examining variability in theme distribution across self-defining memories was beyond the scope of this study. However future research that examines how cognitive flexibility relates to the frequency and variability of themes could be helpful for enhancing our understanding of self representation in ASD.
Given the lack of bias towards positive self-defining memories and the lower reported self-esteem of the ASD group, it is surprising that they did not also report significantly higher levels of depressed mood. Moreover, while a significant relationship between mood and self-esteem was observed in the control group, this was not the case for the group with ASD. Williamson et al. (2008) also detected low self-esteem in adolescents with ASD relative to controls in the context of comparable levels of depressed mood. Similarly Jamison and Schuttler (2015) showed a non-existent relationship between global self-esteem and quality of life in adolescent girls with autism, a relationship that was statistically significant in nonautistic controls. Our data are in line with these studies and contribute further to the suggestion that there may be weaker links between self-perception and mood in autism.
Previous autobiographical memory research found a reduced bias towards a field perspective in memory retrieval in ASD relative to controls (Lind & Bowler, 2010) . Our study found no evidence of group differences. Our null findings may be due to the methodology employed. Lind and Bowler (2010) cued specific memories with different time periods, the majority of which pertained to time-periods of less than a month, whereas we requested memories that were at least six months old. Older memories are more likely to be of observer perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983) and it has also been argued that an observer visual perspective play a particular role in self-defining memories (cf. Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005) . These differences may have served to weaken a bias towards field perspective previously observed in control groups.
The study has several limitations. In particular, the sample size was small and findings need to be replicated with larger samples to ensure reliability. While power analyses indicated sufficient power to detect medium effects sizes for our main hypothesis regarding qualities of self-defining versus everyday memories, our study may have been underpowered for detecting potentially smaller effects for visual perspective and levels of depression. Also, the methodology relied on participants' ability to introspect and make subjective ratings on the contents of their mind. Attributing visual perspective can, arguably be a difficult judgement to make and we had no method of establishing the veridicality of participants' reports. Thus findings may not accurately reflect autobiographical memory processes.
In conclusion this study showed the importance of identifying positive rather than negative, experiences as examples of self. Adolescents with ASD failed to direct their retrieval towards positive self-defining memories and reported that they felt less aligned with their self-defining memories compared to non-autistic controls.This might have been an attempt to protect themselves from negative material. However correlational analysis revealed self-defining rather than everyday memories to impact their self-esteem. Developing a strong and stable concept of self is a prerequisite for understanding others and for developing good social skills; it is also implicated in self-regulation (Matson, Matson, & Rivet, 2007) . More research is needed to understand the mechanisms underlying self-representations in adolescents with ASD and how they relate to psychological health. Our data suggest that initiatives aimed at strengthening the connections between self, memory and mood may be an effective target for intervention.
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